In an effort to contain the diplomatic fallout Chinese occupation of the Mischief Reef, Beijing insisted that its new facilities were only built to serve as temporary shelters of Chinese fishermen, not as permanent military garrisons. China threat instantaneously reverberated throughout the region. Ramos also ordered the destruction of other buoys and markers dropped by Chinese government vessels on other parts of the Philippines’ exclusive economic zones. Then-Philippine President Fidel Ramos raised the issue with his counterparts in ASEAN, and with the United States, the country’s only treaty-ally. It was Manila’s first taste of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Numerous People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels were also found surrounding the area, some of them heavily armed. Soon after, the Philippines discovered that China built structures on top of the reef – four satellite communication-equipped platforms on stilts with at least three octagonal bunkers on each platform. Manila was caught off guard by how quick the Chinese maneuvered to seize the disputed domain. In February 1995, a dangerous monsoon prompted Philippine forces to pause patrols of the Mischief Reef. One key question must be answered: is this something new or do China’s words and actions frequently diverge? A brief review of how Beijing engaged its neighbors in the past two decades reveals the latter to be the case. Van Jackson at the Center for a New American Security calls the apparent disconnect between China’s words and actions, “strategic double speak.” But the worsening strategic environment of the South China Sea requires a more thorough reassessment of China’s diplomacy and security overtures. The presence of offensive weapons contradicted Beijing’s public statements that the reclaimed islands are mainly for civilian purposes.
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